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Abstract:International attention to the impasse in the South China Sea (SCS)
has focused on disputes over island territories and energy resources while overlooking
the region蒺s valuable and fragile ecosystems. In particular, the ecosystems in interna鄄
tional waterways have endured threat from maritime traffic activities. Even so, bor鄄
dering States have yet to implement unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures to
protect these areas. This article argues that the principle of “joint protection冶 of the
sustainable development of the SCS ecosystems offers an opportunity for breaking the
impasse in the SCS and that the establishment of a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
(PSSA) in the SCS raises a new prospect for cooperation in the region.
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玉. “Joint Protection冶 Principle and SCS Impasse
The SCS impasse, covered by maritime boundary delimitation disputes, is in es鄄
sence a result of contention for control of natural resources in the region. The intrac鄄
tability of the SCS disputes overshadows the importance and necessity of protecting
the valuable and fragile ecosystems of the region. In the long run, the sustainable de鄄
velopment of SCS ecosystems is a core issue for the common interests of all parties
concerned; such objective needs are in turn conducive to trust鄄building and coopera鄄
tion among the SCS players.
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A. The Predicament of the “Joint Development冶 Principle
The SCS, China蒺s largest open sea, covers an area of about 3. 5 million km2, e鄄
quivalent to three times the total area of the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea and the East
China Sea. The third largest marginal sea in the world after the Coral and Arabian
Seas, the SCS abounds with energy resources such as oil, natural gas and combusti鄄
ble ice. According to currently available statistics, the SCS boasts over 200 “subma鄄
rine oil fields冶 and 180 oil and gas fields, with oil in place (OIP) amounting to be鄄
tween 23 billion and 30 billion tons, accounting for about one鄄third of the total oil re鄄
serves in China. As such, the area is sometimes referred to as a “ Second Persian
Gulf冶 . 淤
For historical reasons, maritime boundary delimitation disputes over the SCS
have not been resolved. Before the 1970s, States bordering the SCS had not protested
China蒺s claim to sovereignty over the area. Since the discovery of rich oil and natural
gas resources in the SCS, however, disputes over the sovereignty of islands in the re鄄
gion have never ceased, and have intensified vis鄄伽鄄vis changes in the Middle East.
These disputes, superficially over islands, are actually disputes over energy and other
national interests. The principle of “ sovereignty residing with us, shelving disputes
and seeking joint development冶 proposed by China in the 1970s failed to alleviate
tensions or promote in鄄depth cooperation among States bordering the SCS.
China has signed a series of framework agreements with States involved in sover鄄
eignty disputes over the SCS, which have provided a general standard for conduct of
States before the settlement of the sovereignty issue. For example, the Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed in November 2002 in Phnom
Penh provides in article 5: “ The Parties undertake to exercise self鄄restraint in the
conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and
stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently
uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays and other features and to handle their differ鄄
ences in a constructive manner. 冶 Additionally, both the May 2004 Joint
Communiqu佴 of the Government of the People蒺s Republic of China and the Govern鄄
ment of Malaysia and the September 2004 Joint Communiqu佴 of the Government of
the People蒺s Republic of China and the Government of the Philippines reaffirmed the
commitment to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. In
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reality, however, this declaration amounts to little more than a scrap of paper,淤 and
the idea of “ joint development冶 has been replaced by the practice of “ preemptive
grabbing冶. In recent years, the Philippines and Viet Nam, among other nations,
have successively conducted naval exercises, which, though not directly involving the
disputed areas, obviously took place in preparation for potential future actions.
Despite many successful global precedents for “ joint development冶 of disputed
sea areas, including the 1958 Saudi Arabian鄄Bahrain Agreement, the 1969 Abu Dha鄄
bi鄄Qatar Agreement, the 1989 Australian鄄Indonesian Agreement, the 1974 French鄄
Spanish Bay of Biscay Agreement, the 1974 Sudan鄄Saudi Arabian Agreement and the
1974 Japanese鄄South Korean Agreement,于 attempts to pursue similar agreements in
the SCS have encountered difficulties. First, the abovementioned successes usually
occurred in disputed sea areas which had not been delimited as a result of overlapping
continental shelves or exclusive economic zones, instead of involving territorial dis鄄
putes over particular islands as it is the case in the SCS, and a large number of dis鄄
puted islands at that. Second, the SCS involves several States, making unanimity dif鄄
ficult to achieve and complicating efforts to establish either bilateral or multilateral
“joint development冶 cooperative relationships. Last but not least, China has subtle
relations with Southeast Asian States; as a major responsible power China must exer鄄
cise caution in “ energy battles冶 and carefully consider its international reputation.
The difficulties surrounding the principle of “joint development冶 have forced China to
seek other ways to resolve or relieve the SCS impasse.
B. Advantages of the “Joint Development冶 Principles
When the principle of “sovereignty residing with us, shelving disputes and see鄄
king joint development冶 fails to resolve the situation and freedom of navigation propa鄄
gates unchecked in the region, the environmental conditions of the SCS suffer contin鄄
uous deterioration and the resources therein experience gradual depletion. The intrac鄄
tability of SCS disputes over territory and energy eclipses the importance and necessi鄄
ty of protecting the valuable and fragile ecosystems of the area. The sustainable de鄄
velopment of marine ecosystems is a core issue for humanity and the protection of the
planet. Hence, cooperation on marine environmental protection offers excellent possi鄄
bilities for mitigating tensions in the SCS.
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The advantages of alleviating the impasse in the SCS through the principle of
“joint protection冶 of marine environments rather than through the principle of “ joint
development冶 are as follows:
First, marine environmental protection has a moral high ground over the devel鄄
opment of nonliving resources and is more consistent with the theory of sustainable
development and the common interests of the human race; as such, the principle of
marine environmental protection is more acceptable for the States bordering the SCS
and for the international community. In other words, no matter how the SCS is ulti鄄
mately delimited, each relevant State has an obligation to protect its ecological envi鄄
ronment and is thus obliged to cooperate on the issue of environmental protection. In
addition, the 1982 United Nations on the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN鄄
CLOS) specifically requires States bordering an enclosed or semi鄄enclosed sea淤 such
as the SCS to cooperate with each other in the exercise of rights and the performance
of duties. 于 This requirement, though not a legal obligation, 盂 ought to be observed
by such bordering States as it is scientifically based.
Second, the theory of neoliberalism divides State interests into “ relative gains冶
and “absolute gains. 冶 With regards to high political matters such as national securi鄄
ty, war and peace, States are concerned with “ relative gains冶; in other words,
States care not only about their own individual national gains, but also about ad鄄
vances made by other States. This situation of evaluating relative gains has greatly
complicated efforts to reach agreements in areas such as arms control and territorial
disputes. With regards to low political matters such as economics, the environment
and society, however, States care more about “absolute gains冶; that is, they focus
primarily on their own individual national gains, thus leaving more room for coopera鄄
tion. 榆 The Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agree鄄
ment Area in the South China Sea recently signed by China, the Philippines and Viet
Nam provides a good illustration: the first case of cooperation in the SCS came about
in the field of marine scientific research in which States prioritize “absolute gains冶 o鄄
ver relative gains.
Accordingly, though with a breakthrough over marine environmental protection
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tion冶 stands a better chance of materialization than “joint development冶. Of course,
“joint protection冶 and “joint development冶 are not mutually exclusive; instead, it is
the failure of the latter to achieve remarkable results over a long period of time that
highlights the advantages of the former. According to developing trends in the law of
the sea, making full use of international concern over marine environmental protection
will not only help alleviate tensions in the SCS but also contribute to China蒺s long鄄
term interests.
Third, China蒺s voice in the international legislation arena has always been weak.
Essentially, China only plays the role of a passive follower and has almost never initi鄄
ated legislative proposals or policy drafts. Even when objecting to proposals by other
States, China only expresses its position in principle, seldom offering concrete sug鄄
gestions for improvement. In regional legislative activities, China acts in much the
same way. These practices are inconsistent with the image of China as a rising major
power hoping to take on greater international responsibilities. Several major enclosed
or semi鄄enclosed sea areas in the world have regional conventions for working on is鄄
sues of marine environmental protection, for example, the 1974 Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki Convention),
the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the
Coastal Region of the Mediterranean ( Barcelona Convention), the 1982 Regional
Convention for the Conservation of the Environment of the Red Sea and the Gulf of A鄄
den and the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, a鄄
mong others. It is unfortunate that the SCS, a typical semi鄄enclosed sea, lacks simi鄄
lar regional cooperation on marine environmental protection. This situation offers an
opportunity for China to play a leading role in the region.
China possesses absolute advantages over other bordering States in terms of its
capacity for marine scientific research and its ability to enforce maritime law. China
should thus play a dominant role in the cooperation on marine environmental protec鄄
tion in the SCS. First, China should actively conduct scientific and policy research in
preparation for regional conventions. Meanwhile, China should bravely put forward
constructive proposals and even policy drafts. Second, China should actively engage
in diplomatic activities including creating a consultation mechanism for the prepara鄄
tion of regional conventions in order to strengthen communications and exchanges a鄄
mong relevant States. Such actions will help China display a responsible posture as a
major power.
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域. Environmental Threats Posed by Maritime
Transportation and SCS Disputes
摇 摇 The SCS has become one of the most disputed sea areas in the world not only be鄄
cause of its rich living and non鄄living resources, but also because it serves as one of
the world蒺s busiest shipping routes. With its prominent strategic position, the SCS has
become a sea area in which big powers and regional blocs contend with each other for
control in order to ensure their respective strategic interests.
On one hand, the United States (US) military, looking to promote American
hegemony and in particular military presence in the SCS region, has worked to con鄄
stantly improve its surveillance of regional militaries such as those of China, North
Korea and Russia. Moreover, because trade with the Asian鄄Pacific region accounts
for over 60% of total US foreign trade, the US has strong political, economic, mili鄄
tary and strategic incentives to strengthen American control over the SCS. After 9 /
11, in order to cope with the dual threats of marine terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the US proposed the Regional Maritime Security Initia鄄
tive (RMSI) with the hope of strengthening its control over the Malacca Strait, a
“strategic chokepoint control冶 for the US. In recent years, the US and some South鄄
east Asian States have conducted large鄄scale triphibian military exercises in the SCS
region. At the same time, Japan, no longer content to remain merely an economic
power, is looking to strengthen its political and military power. While strengthening
its alliance with the US, Japan has continued to build up its military forces in order to
play a larger role in regional security affairs. Japan has also continuously strength鄄
ened its oceans legislation and used its maritime strength to promote its proposals for
delimitation of maritime disputes. Japan frequently dispatches its navy throughout the
SCS on the pretext of combating maritime smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal im鄄
migration etc. Russia too has important strategic interests in the Asia鄄Pacific region.
Though it remains strategically focused on Europe, Russia attaches great importance
to developing relations with States such as China, Japan, India and South Korea. 淤
On the other hand, the SCS is crucial to the energy security of East Asian States
such as China, Japan and South Korea. 70% of Japan蒺s crude oil is transported
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through the SCS. 淤 Each year, over one half of the world蒺s very large crude carriers
(VLCC) and cargo ships and two鄄thirds of the world蒺s liquefied natural gas (LNG)
trade moves through these waters. Yet relevant SCS States including China have not
specifically regulated such ships. 于 Even in the territorial waters around the islands
and reefs over which they claim sovereignty, no nation has designed or set up sea
lane and traffic separation schemes according to shipping safety regulations, let alone
set aside specific transit passages for oil tankers, nuclear power ships and ships carry鄄
ing hazardous substances.
For instance, nine of Japan蒺s nuclear plants send their nuclear waste to France
or the United Kingdom for treatment. Over the last three decades, several hundred
tons of nuclear waste have been transported by sea from Japan to Europe, in addition
to the post鄄treatment distilled plutonium and solidified nuclear waste transported back
to Japan. 盂 Japan has been frequently condemned and resisted by States along this
route for its failure to cooperate with relevant States or make publicly available its ma鄄
rine pollution monitoring and environmental assessment reports. 榆 In 1995, Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, South Africa, Nauru and Kiribati prohibited nuclear waste carriers
from entering their exclusive economic zones; Chile even managed to force a ship
bearing prohibited cargo to change its route and sail away from Chile. In 1996, Ar鄄
gentina led 13 States to press for the adoption of a comprehensive and mandatory con鄄
vention on transporting radioactive substance by sea at a conference of the Interna鄄
tional Maritime Organization (IMO). On March 8, 1999, the Heads of Government
of the Caribbean Community reiterated their “unwavering opposition冶 to the “blatant
and persistent use of the Caribbean Sea for the transhipment of highly toxic nuclear
materials. 冶 They called on Japan and other States to “desist from this dangerous mis鄄
use of the Caribbean Sea. 冶虞 In contrast, the bordering States of the SCS, one of the
sea areas where Japan transits its nuclear waste, have not officially lodged protests,
let alone set up safeguard measures.
Despite claiming sovereignty over various islands and reefs in the SCS, and clai鄄
96
Particularly Sensitive Sea Area:






Wang Yizhi, A Reconsideration on the South China Sea Issue: from the Perspective of Sio鄄US
Relation, Fudan American Review, No. 1, 2006, p. 84. (in Chinese)
Chen Weiwei, The City of Sansa: Great Expectations, Energy Review, No. 9, 2012, p. 121.
(in chinese)
Zhao Yajuan, Legal Reflection on Japan蒺s Secret Sea Shipping of Extremely Hazardous Nuclear
Substances, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, p. 105. (in Chinese)
Zhao Yajuan, Legal Reflection on Japan蒺s Secret Sea Shipping of Extremely Hazardous Nuclear
Substances, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, p. 115. (in Chinese)
Zhao Yajuan, Legal Reflection on Japan蒺s Secret Sea Shipping of Extremely Hazardous Nuclear
Substances, China Oceans Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005, pp. 106 ~ 107. (in Chinese)
China Oceans Law Review (2012 Number 2)
ming 200-nm exclusive economic zones, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Malaysia, In鄄
donesia and Brunei all focus only on “sovereignty冶 over the relevant islands and reefs
and fishing activities within their respective “exclusive economic zone冶, without pay鄄
ing adequate attention to shipping activities, especially vessels carrying oil and haz鄄
ardous materials. In addition, the law enforcement activities in the SCS are suscepti鄄
ble to disputes, with which these States are so preoccupied that they have little time
for issues of marine environmental protection beyond those which coincide with sover鄄
eignty claims and resource interests. In fact, most of the SCS waters are subject to
unchecked freedom of navigation. There are no strict technical specifications or legal
management for shipping vessels carrying hazardous materials, foreign naval vessels
and VLCCs. Due to its unique hydrological, geological and climatic conditions, the
SCS is an area that can easily give rise to marine accidents. Consequently, the pre鄄
cious and fragile SCS ecosystems face constant threat from regional shipping.
芋. Reflections on the Establishment of a PSSA in the SCS
Protection of SCS ecosystems cannot wait until the respective governments settle
their sovereignty disputes. The most effective approach is to promote active coopera鄄
tion among States through the marine protected area (MPA) regime set up by the in鄄
ternational community. Three kinds of MPAs exist to specifically address environmen鄄
tal threats from shipping activities - Maritime Agreement Regarding Oil Pollution
(MARPOL) special areas, Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs), and Emission
Control Areas (ECAs). Among these, PSSAs offer the most advantages for the fol鄄
lowing reasons:
First, as relevant protective measures for PSSAs may be any measures specified
by IMO conventions, protective measures for MARPOL special areas and ECAs from
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships may all be ap鄄
plied to PSSAs. Second, relevant protective measures for PSSAs may also be derived
from the shipping management measures of the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which can help prevent the occurrence of marine traffic ac鄄
cidents and prevent vessel source pollution. Third, PSSAs offer significant room for
development of relevant protective measures; in other words, participating States may
adopt new protective measures, such as those guarding against physical damage to
marine environments brought about through shipping. After the establishment of a
PSSA, relevant protective measures may be strengthened and adjusted. Finally, ac鄄
companying the abundance of relevant protective measures, a PSSA regime fully re鄄
flects the comprehensive requirements of ecosystem management and offers the best
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option for maintaining the sustainable development of target waters.
These advantages offered by a PSSA markedly outweigh the challenges posed by
lengthy and complicated application procedures. In the long run, such a regime pres鄄
ents the best prospect of development, and will gain favor with more and more States.
Currently, the IMO has approved the establishment of 12 PSSAs, most of which are
located in Europe and North America, and none of which are in Asia, a region a鄄
bounding with vital international sea lanes. As the SCS meets the IMO criteria for es鄄
tablishing a PSSA in terms of natural and shipping conditions, China should take ini鄄
tiative to advocate the establishment of a PSSA in the SCS and conduct active cooper鄄
ation with relevant States.
A. The SCS and PSSA Criteria
Considering the natural conditions of the SCS, which meet the ecological criteria
set out by the Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly
Sensitive Sea Areas of the IMO in 2005, and its environmental vulnerability as well
as its strategic significance to international shipping, there is no theoretical barrier to
the establishment of a PSSA in the SCS.
1. Dependency
The SCS is a unique region for the study of the interaction between global cli鄄
mate change and the geochemical processes of marine organisms. The SCS蒺s ocean
currents and general atmospheric circulation are remarkably regulated by its monsoon
climate; typhoons are also typical of the region. Over a long time frame, El Nino
markedly regulates the SCS current circulation and water evaporation. Therefore, the
SCS is particularly sensitive to the impact of climate change and as such offers an ide鄄
al site for the study of regional responses to global changes. 淤 In addition, the SCS is
one of the world蒺s most significant marginal sea areas and also the largest marginal sea
in China. As one of the most important carbon sinks in the vicinity,于 the region
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holds great political and economic significance to China. 淤
The SCS has an extensive continental shelf and therefore provides an excellent
place to study the impact of continental shelf processes on the deep sea. Moreover,
the semi鄄enclosed nature of the SCS means that the internal circulation of seawater
within, especially in the upper layer of the sea, plays an important role in the opera鄄
tion of SCS ecosystems. In addition, the SCS has a 4000-m deep sea basin. Taken
together, these unique features provide this relatively small space with the character鄄
istics of both an open sea and marginal sea, making the SCS especially suitable for
comparative study of open and nearshore waters. 于
2. Diversity
Long regarded as the global center of neritic and tropical biodiversity, the SCS
has 45 of the world蒺s 57 mangrove species, 50 of its 70 corallium genera, 20 of its
sea鄄weed species, and 7 of its 9 giant clam species. 盂 The SCS wetland is the most
biodiverse region in China. It abounds in wetland resources of numerous types. All
coastal wetland types in the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Es鄄
pecially as Waterfowl Habitat can be found in this region. 榆
3. Productivity
The SCS abounds in natural and fisheries resources. In particular it houses huge
amounts of oil and natural gas. The whole SCS area has over 200 seabed oilfields and
180 oil and gas fields. The geological reserves of oil are between roughly 23 and 30
billion tons, accounting for about one鄄third of the total resource reserves of China.
Thus, the SCS is also called a “ Second Persian Gulf. 冶虞 Besides conventional off鄄
shore oil and natural gas resources, the SCS may also contain large quantities of new
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crusts and platinum family elements. 淤
The SCS is rich in fisheries resources, including 1064 kinds of recorded fishes,
135 kinds of decapods, and 73 kinds of cephalopods, among which there are about
100 kinds of most economically valuable fishes. Hairtail fish, cuttlefish, butterfish,
red coat and other commercial fish are distributed throughout the SCS area. Benthic
fishes mainly include saurida, hairtail fish, red coat and grouper, among others;
mesopelagic and pelagic fishes mainly include sardinellaaurita, wart perch and de鄄
capterus maruadsi, among others. In the central southern region of the SCS, there
are tuna, sailfish and other oceanic fishes. In addition, there are considerable a鄄
mounts of primitive fisheries resources in the SCS. According to some scholars蒺 esti鄄
mate, before 1975 when motor vessels began seeing large鄄scale use, the density of
fisheries resources reached 1100 kg per square kilometer in the northern sea area,
2300 kg per square kilometer in the Beibu Gulf sea area, and 1120 kg per square kil鄄
ometer in the Xisha fishing ground. 于 As an important world fishing ground, the SCS
is of great significance to the food safety of its bordering States, and is also a key
source of export revenues for these States: the fish catch of the SCS accounts for 10%
of the world total. In addition, five of the world蒺s eight leading producers of prawns
border the SCS. 盂
4. Vulnerability
The SCS is a sea area rife with the danger of marine traffic accidents. Located
between 23毅 N and 3毅 S, extending to the south of the equator, joining the Taiwan
Strait in the north, running through the Malacca and Singapore Straits in the west and
the Karimata Strait in the south, the SCS is a “chokepoint冶 between the Pacific O鄄
cean the Indian Ocean, where most of the marine traffic of the Far East, Europe, Af鄄
rica, the Middle East and South Asia passes. 榆 For China alone, 21 of its 39 interna鄄
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tional shipping routes must pass through the SCS. 淤 Clearly, the SCS occupies a
prominent global strategic position. As an international seaborne trade passage whose
maritime cargo volume is seconded only by the Mediterranean Sea, the SCS bears the
transit of a quarter of the world蒺s crude oil and petroleum products and over a half of
the world蒺s VLCCs. 于 Over 41,000 vessels pass through the SCS each year, over two
times the traffic seen by the Suez Canal and nearly three times that of the Panama Ca鄄
nal. 盂 Each year, over a half of the world蒺s merchant tonnage travels through the Ma鄄
lacca Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait. 榆
Located in the Asian monsoon belt, the littoral areas of the SCS can see ocean
currents driven by large鄄scale sea breezes so strong as to reach 1 to 2 nautical miles
high. This type of bad weather can occur at any time throughout the monsoon season.
Although the typhoon season lasts only from June to November, the maximum wind
speed during that period can be as high as 120 km / h or 35 m / s. Moreover, naviga鄄
tional and hydrological characteristics observed under typical conditions are often un鄄
certain or incomplete. Many areas throughout the region have not undergone sufficient
probing and exploration. As a result, shipping through the SCS is apparently unsafe.
Given the above conditions, the SCS sees a very high incidence of maritime traf鄄
fic accidents. For example, from 1974 to 1994, 77 vessels and their passengers
drowned within the area, of which a ferry accident in 1984 was the most serious,
leading to 120 deaths. Additional statistical data shows that in the past two decades,
139 major accidents took place, involving 930,000 deadweight tons and causing 254
deaths. 虞 The huge traffic volume and frequent shipping accidents have placed tre鄄
mendous pressure on the SCS environment. Vessel source pollution and physical
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B. Suggestions on the Location of SCS PSSA
The SCS, located between 23毅27忆 N and 3毅00忆 S, and between 99毅10忆 E and
122毅10忆 E,淤 is a semi鄄enclosed sea extending about 3400 km (1800 nm) from the
north to the south, and about 1200 km (650 nm) from the east to the west, covering
a total sea area of about 3. 5 million km2 . 于 As shown by detailed scientific data, the
SCS is also one of the most biodiverse waters in the world. 盂 At the same time, in the
past two decades, the SCS has become one of the waters most affected by human ac鄄
tivities. 榆 The area is among the busiest shipping routes in the world. 虞 The ecological
characteristics and shipping traffic of the region demands protection by way of a
PSSA, yet the specific location of an SCS PSSA requires detailed and accurate scien鄄
tific data as well as physical oceanographic research. This article briefly identifies the
most biodiverse area within the SCS, the area with the highest human impact, and
the area with the highest concentration of shipping; the region where these three areas
most overlap will be best qualified for the protections of a PSSA. The specific re鄄
search methods and steps used to attain the conclusions drawn in Fig. 1 are as fol鄄
lows:
First, the shaded areas in Fig. 1 are the areas with the highest biodiversity and
human impact. Globally, only 2. 2 million km2 sea areas match the extent seen here,
including areas in the East China Sea, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the east鄄
ern part of the Caribbean Sea, the east coast of North America, the Mediterranean
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Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Bering Sea and some areas around Sri Lanka. 淤
Second, the shipping data presented in Fig. 1 comes from the WMO Voluntary
Observing Ships (VOS) Scheme,于 in which shipping charts are made on the as鄄
sumption of straight line navigation. Due to its voluntary nature, the VOS scheme
misses a significant amount of commercial shipping traffic information. In particular,
the traffic density of the busiest sections may have been substantially underestimated.
In other words, the actual traffic flow of the busiest shipping traffic areas marked in
Fig. 1 may very well be higher than suggested.
Third, the U鄄shaped line in Fig. 1, which is from a map attached to a note pres鄄
ented by China to the UN Secretary General on May 7, 2009盂, is the boundary basis
for China蒺s claim to territories in the South China Sea. The position of the predicted
location of the PSSA relative to the U鄄shaped line will impact the international legal
issues involved in the application for establishing a SCS PSSA as well as its future
management.
Based on the above research, the predicted location of the SCS PSSA marked in
Fig. 1 extends from 105毅31忆48义 ~ 109毅4忆48义 E and 3毅14忆24义 ~ 9毅7忆12义 N, with its
center at 107毅56忆34郾 8义 E and 6毅44忆16郾 8义 N, covering an area of about 46,840 km2 .
These areas are not only especially biodiverse and exposed to serious human impact,
but also have the densest shipping routes. In all three of these indexes, the outlined
areas of the SCS rank among the top globally. As a result, these areas meet the IMO





Benjamin S. Halpern, Shaun Walbridge, Kimberly A. Selkoe, Carrie V. Kappel, Fiorenza
Micheli, Caterina D忆Agrosa, John F. Bruno, Kenneth S. Casey, Colin Ebert, Helen E. Fox,
Rod Fujita, Dennis Heinemann, Hunter S. Lenihan, Elizabeth M. P. Madin, Matthew T. Perry,
Elizabeth R. Selig, Mark Spalding, Robert Steneck and Reg Watson, A Global Map of Human
Impact on Marine Ecosystems, Science, Vol. 319, No. 5865, 2008, p. 949.
The WMO Voluntary Observing Ships (VOS) Scheme, at http: / / www. vos. noaa. gov / vos _
scheme. shtml, 5 April 2012.
Communications received with regard to the joint submission made by Malaysia and Viet Nam to
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, at http: / / www. un. org / Depts / los / clcs_
new / submissions_files / mysvnm33_09 / chn_2009re_mys_vnm. pdf, 31 March 2012.
Fig. 1摇 Predicted Location of SCS PSSA
摇 摇 Sources:(1)Derek P. Tittensor, Camilo Mora, Walter Jetz, Heike K. Lotze, Daniel Ricard,
Edward Vanden Berghe and Boris Worm, Global Patterns and Predictors of Marine Biodiversity
across Taxa, Nature, Vol. 466, 2010, pp. 1098 ~ 1103. (2) Benjamin S. Halpern, Shaun Wal鄄
77
Particularly Sensitive Sea Area:
A Possible Approach of Cooperation in the South China Sea
China Oceans Law Review (2012 Number 2)
bridge, Kimberly A. Selkoe, Carrie V. Kappel, Fiorenza Micheli, Caterina D忆Agrosa, John F. Bru鄄
no, Kenneth S. Casey, Colin Ebert, Helen E. Fox, Rod Fujita, Dennis Heinemann, Hunter S.
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C. Cooperation among Related States on the SCS PSSA
It can be seen from the position of the predicted location that the establishment
of a PSSA calls for cooperation between China and four other States- Viet Nam, Ma鄄
laysia, Singapore and Indonesia- to submit a joint application to the IMO. Manage鄄
ment activities after the establishment of the PSSA will also require close cooperation
among these five States.
Based on existing global PSSAs, certain obstacles can be expected and easily
cleared provided that the concerned States make a concerted effort. Therefore, this
author suggests that China propose the establishment of an SCS PSSA Committee com鄄
prising delegates from all five States. The committee will not be of permanent nature
nor affiliated with any regional organization. Its delegates will consist primarily of sci鄄
entific and legal experts conducting joint research. After the establishment of an SCS
PSSA, the committee may also undertake the making of official nautical charts for
publicity and explanation of “ relevant protective measures冶, which occur with the
aim of sustainable development of SCS ecosystems and regional peace and not with
the particular interests of the relevant States in mind. The States with the highest sci鄄
entific research competence and exposed to the greatest impact of establishing a PSSA
should play a leading role in the work of the committee. As some waters in the pre鄄
dicted location are within the historic waters claimed by China, and as the State with
the strongest scientific research capacity in the SCS region, China should actively
play a leading role as a responsible power.
郁. Conclusion
The long鄄pending boundary delimitation disputes and longstanding tensions in
the SCS have left a vacuum in the protection of valuable and fragile SCS ecosystems.
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Relative to resolving struggles over energy resources, reaching an agreement on ma鄄
rine environmental protection is substantially easier. Therefore, the “ joint protec鄄
tion冶 principle starting from the perspective of sustainable development of all SCS e鄄
cosystems, though unable to completely resolve the SCS impasse, can nonetheless
play a significant role in mitigating the situation. Another reason for the difficulty in
breaking through the SCS impasse is its important strategic position in international
shipping routes. Regretfully, the coastal States have not fulfilled their due responsi鄄
bilities for marine environmental governance and shipping route management. Addi鄄
tionally, no relative regional cooperative mechanism has been established for the
semi鄄enclosed SCS, especially with regard to special norms for oil tankers, nuclear鄄
powered ships and vessels carrying hazardous materials, nor is an effective emergency
response mechanism available in case of shipping accidents. Fortunately, the IMO
has devoted much effort to prevent threats to marine environment posed by shipping,
and the PSSA regime it has established is widely acclaimed within the international
community. The ecological importance of the SCS and the region蒺s importance for
shipping, as well as the sensitive relationship between the two, fit precisely with the
IMO requirements for establishing a PSSA. Accordingly, this author proposes estab鄄
lishing a PSSA in the SCS to actively make use of international ecological system
management tools in the hope of fostering cooperation in the SCS region and properly
fulfilling China蒺s leading role in regional developments.
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